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ABSTRACT
THE MANUAL FLIGHT SKILL OF MODERN AIRLINE PILOTS
by Antonio F. Puentes

The manual flight ability of commercial airline pilots has been scrutinized
after several aviation disasters in the first decade of the 21st century where pilot
error has been a contributing cause. Voluntary pilot incident reports from the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Aviation Safety Reporting
System (ASRS) were examined as one method to determine the prevalence of
manual flight skill decline among airline pilots. The investigation studied reports
from unstabilized approach to landings where the pilots manually controlled the
aircraft during descent. An analysis of the ASRS reports from pilots flying
traditional flight deck aircraft compared with pilots flying aircraft with advanced
technology flight decks revealed no significant difference in unstabilized
approaches. Two additional analyses comparing ASRS reports from regional air
carriers versus major air carriers as well as international operations and domestic
operations from major air carriers, determined no significant differences in
unstabilized approaches. The research indicates that ASRS voluntary incident
reports cannot determine significant differences in airline pilot manual flight
control between different airline operation types or flight deck technologies.
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Introduction
Throughout history, people have looked for ways to reduce workload
through the use of tools and machines. In the 19th century, machines began to
be used to complete the manual tasks that humans once performed, sparking the
industrial revolution. Today, automated systems perform many daily tasks
throughout our lives. Alarm clocks wake us up at a specified hour, programmed
brewing machines make our coffee, and robots automatically vacuum the floor
while maneuvering around obstacles.
In the automotive industry, automation assistance has significant potential
for applications in passenger vehicles, heavy trucks, and public transportation
(Bishop, 2000). With the help of on-board vehicle automation, cars can now
parallel park themselves without the need of a human driver (Moran, 2006). Now
that cars can perform this challenging task, what will happen to the parallel
parking skill of the driver if the automatic system is no longer available?
Research in basic motor skills has shown that the length of delay without practice
has a significant effect on the ability to recall and perform a learned task (SavionLemieux, & Penhune, 2005). Therefore, the once proficient driver will have a
much more difficult time trying to manually park without the automatic system.
Along with the benefits of automation come consequences, many of which are
yet to be discovered.
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As a result of prolonged use of automation, pilots flying complicated
airliners may also be unprepared to manually take over controls when
automation fails or performs unexpectedly. During a routine flight in 2010, a
Boeing 737- Next Generation aircraft began an uncontrolled dive towards the
ocean below. The First Officer struggled to comprehend exactly what was
happening while paralyzed by fear. The Captain, who had left the flight deck to
use the restroom, was frantically trying to get back into the locked flight deck.
Once entry was gained, the Captain was able to bring the aircraft under control
and return to cruise flight. The First Officer had accidently disengaged the
automatic pilot, but fear, panic, and the lack of manual flight practice, prevented
him from recovering the airplane from its nose dive. This event is not an over
dramatized, made for TV movie, but actually happened on an Air India Express
flight, according to the official incident report (Directorate General of Civil
Aviation, 2010).
The flying public expects that the two pilots sitting on the flight deck are
more than capable of flying the aircraft safety while under manual control.
However, recent research has indicated that many pilots are not maintaining the
basic flying skills required to manually control an airplane safely (Ebbatson,
2009; Gillen, 2008). United States pilots are not immune to this problem and
have been recently chastised by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as
well as an executive from a pilot union representing thousands of professional
pilots for their lack of hand flying practice (Croft, 2010). The ability of Captain
2

Chesley Sullenberger to manually fly his crippled aircraft safely into the Hudson
is the exception rather than the norm (National Transportation Safety Board
[NTSB], 2010). The flight skill that Captain Sullenberger demonstrated that
February afternoon may have been the dramatic end to an entire era of aviators.
A new generation of pilots is earning its wings while becoming increasingly reliant
on technology, and may no longer possess the manual skills to proficiently fly
complicated aircraft (Ebbatson, 2009; Gillen, 2008).
The Introduction of Automation
From the onset of powered flight, the need for flight control assistance was
immediately recognized as a means to improve safety and reduce pilot workload.
Lawrence Sperry is credited with developing the first system to automate piloting
control tasks, which he successfully demonstrated in 1914. He later went on to
develop and patent the gyroscopic instruments that have become the foundation
of modern instrumentation (Scheck, 2006). Thanks to the courage of early
aviation pioneers like Wiley Post and Jimmy Doolittle, aircraft automation began
to take an ever-increasing role on the flight deck and has provided the basis for
the operation of commercial aviation in nearly any type of inclement weather.
The autopilot was an important development as it freed up cognitive and physical
resources in high workload environments as well as mundane cruise flight.
Airlines have also promoted autopilot as a means to reduce fuel costs and help
their bottom line (Weiner & Curry 1980; Weiner, 1988). Basic autopilots quickly
3

gave way to more complex and intelligent flight automation systems and became
more advanced and dependable, allowing pilots to become more dependent
upon their use. As technology advanced into the 21st century, the aviation
industry has always kept pace, implementing the newest on-board systems and
electronics such as the Electronic Flight Instrumentation System (EFIS) and
Flight Management System (FMS).
Aircraft terminology has also adapted to changes in technology. The term
“cockpit” comes from the nautical reference for the cramped quarters of a junior
officer below the main deck (cockpit, n.d.) and quickly carried over to the limited
space available for pilots in early aircraft. Today, the term “flight deck” has
become synonymous with today’s advanced technology aircraft (flight deck, n.d.).
While this term also has nautical roots, its origin is aviation specific; derived from
the flying boats of the 1920’s where the pilots occupied the entire upper level of
the aircraft (Johnson, 2009).
Automation took a giant leap forward in the late 1970’s when two nearly
simultaneous events took place; the two-man flight crew was introduced and the
entrance of the “glass cockpit” (the use of digital displays instead of traditional
dials and gauges to display flight information) on the flight deck of the Airbus
A310 occurred (Airbus, 2011). The aircraft manufacturer Airbus revolutionized
the way pilots interact and interface with their aircraft in fundamental ways.
Analog dials gave way to digital displays and traditional cable-and-pulley flight
controls became remotely operated, electronically actuated systems known as
4

“fly-by-wire.” In the Airbus A310, computers drive complicated flight
management systems, simplifying pilot tasks and freeing up cognitive resources.
The first glass cockpit aircraft, the Airbus A310 and the Boeing 767 and 757,
were years ahead of the way the previous generation of aircraft were flown and
managed. Tasks such as holding patterns, that were normally calculated and
drawn on notepads, were now computed by a flight management computer and
graphically displayed on a cathode ray tube (CRT) display. The cognitive
workload of entering and flying a holding pattern was reduced, freeing up mental
resources for other tasks.
Modern technology now available to flight crews has dramatically
increased aircraft efficiency and improved safety while reducing workload during
critical phases of flight. Unfortunately, the added benefits gained by the use of
automation have also created unexpected side effects that could compromise
safety. Much effort has been spent on researching the challenges and pitfalls of
automating the flight deck and also in the proper way to develop flight deck
technology (Billings, 1991; Harris et al, 1985; Weiner & Curry, 1980; Curry,
1985). For all the effort spent on reducing pilot workload, the actual assistance
to pilots during high stress phases of flight is questionable (Billings, 1991). The
lack of recent manual flight practice with modern airline flight crews has the
potential to place the entire aircraft in jeopardy. Thousands of hours of flight time
without much actual piloting places the proficiency of flight crews into question.
Aviation accidents tracked by The Boeing Company (2011) show that 53 percent
5

of all commercial airline fatal accidents since 1959 occurred during the takeoff
and landing phases of flight; those segments almost exclusively hand flown by
pilots. In a recent survey, 43% of pilots indicated that their manual flying skills
have declined since flying advanced technology aircraft (Bureau of Air Safety
Investigation, 1998). This decreasing trend in skill required to manually fly the
aircraft may signal an unintended consequence of implementing new technology.
Ushering the Era of Complacency
As the technology on the flight deck began to change, capturing the
attitudes of pilots who were going through the flight deck revolution revealed
crucial insight into the initial acceptance of pilots flying modern aircraft. Many of
the transitioning pilots were quick to realize the potential benefits the new
automation provided but were immediately aware of the potential for a
degradation of manual flying skill and the potential to compromise safety (Curry,
1985; Rudisill, 1995). Researchers have identified that when automation
changes the way human operators perform the tasks, complacency begins to
manifest itself, especially in multi-task environments such as the flight deck
(Parasuraman, Molloy & Singh, 1993). Airline pilot flight instructors noticed that
First Officers of automated aircraft who were transitioning to the Captain position
in older jet aircraft needed significantly more training time to qualify after
“displaying inactivity and complacency” (Weiner & Curry, 1980, p. 9).
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Flight deck control systems, such as autopilot and autothrottles, perform
many of the physical manipulations of the flight controls most of the older
generation of pilots learned from experience. Basic flying knowledge, such as the
relationship between specific power settings and pitch attitude, which results in
an exact airspeed, becomes more difficult to recall, or is never learned by student
pilots when an aircraft performs tasks automatically. The problems associated
with complacency from overuse of automated systems can be alleviated to some
extent by routine manual flight practice. Many pilots recognize the need to
practice “hand flying” during short periods of flight, especially during complex
operations such as landing and takeoff, and in and out of congested airports, to
overcome the complacency of automation (Weiner, 1985; Curry, 1985). However,
the automation was designed to reduce pilot workload during the takeoff and
landing phases of flight. Most airlines strongly encourage autopilot use during
the majority of operations, but do acknowledge the need for manual practice
occasionally as noted by at least one Flight Operation Manual at a United States
air carrier (Gillen, 2008). In practice, there does not seem to be any
standardization of when to manually fly the aircraft, and each pilot makes that
decision based on their own personal comfort level in accordance with company
policy and upon agreement of the crew.
Many procedures in and out of heavily congested airports require the sole
use of automation as a means of maintaining precise flight tracks in increasing
traffic density environments. Many pilots have become accustomed to rely upon
7

the autopilot and automation as standard operating practice. Many times when
there is an anomaly or an unexpected automation action, flight crews will try to
“program their way out” (Curry, 1985, p. 30) of the situation rather than
disconnect the automation and manually fly the aircraft. When a runway
assignment on approach to landing is suddenly changed, both pilots may be
focusing on the associated piece of technology with their heads down, sacrificing
vigilance out the windows. This situation in many cases happens during a critical
phase of flight, normally approach to landing, where the airspace becomes
congested with arrivals and departures (Damos, John, & Lyall, 1999). In
responding to the automation, the human is taken out of the loop of first flying the
airplane, and redirects attention and cognitive resources to the automation. The
accident of Eastern Air Flight 401 serves as a reminder of what can happen
when a flight crew diverts their attention to tasks other than flying the aircraft. An
item as trivial as a burned out light bulb on a critical system (landing gear position
indicator) at a critical phase of flight (circling the airport) was such a powerful
distraction that the flight crew failed to realize the autopilot was not holding their
assigned altitude of 2,000 feet and the aircraft crashed into the swampy Florida
Everglades (NTSB, 1973).
The over-reliance on automation may also cause pilots to become
physically disconnected from the aircraft, and they may miss the subtle
aerodynamic warnings of an impending flight hazard. As the aerodynamic loads
placed upon an aircraft exceed the ability of the automation to manage the
8

situation, the autopilot suddenly disengages leaving the flight crew with very little
time to recover an aircraft that is out of control. The fatal accident of American
Eagle Flight 4184 (NTSB, 1996) and near fatal incident of China Airlines Flight
006 (NTSB, 1985) occurred when the autopilot was engaged during a time when
the aircraft was struggling to maintain stable flight. The crew did not realize the
danger because they were physically disconnected from the aircraft and could
not recognize the warnings because the autopilot was operating.
With the autopilot engaged, China Airlines Flight 006 had an engine failure
during cruise, causing a change in flight characteristics. Once the autopilot could
no longer compensate for the change in flight characteristics, it rolled and
plunged 32,000 feet before the pilots recovered, just above the ocean. There
were only two injured passengers as a result of the loss of control. Although the
aircraft sustained some damage due to the aerodynamic forces experienced from
the event, the aircraft was able to make a safe emergency landing approximately
300 nautical miles from the intended destination.
The passengers aboard American Eagle Flight 4184 were not so
fortunate. As the aircraft was circling outside of Chicago, significant amounts of
ice began to accumulate on the aircraft, which increased the aircraft’s weight and
altered the aerodynamic characteristics of the wings. Unknown to the flight crew,
the autopilot was struggling to maintain the selected altitude while also
attempting to handle the change in aircraft aerodynamics. Suddenly, the
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automation disengaged just as the aircraft rolled inverted and spun uncontrollably
towards the ground.
Investigators can only speculate if the pilots were hand flying the aircraft,
could they have recognized the imminent danger they were in, and would they
have been able to take steps to recover in time. By being physically
disconnected from the aircraft, precious moments may be lost during an
emergency because the aerodynamic warning signals of danger are lost.
Flight Skill Decay with Non-practice
Early research examining the loss or decay of pilot flight skills used crude
flight simulators, or suspended aircraft models. This initial research focused on
assessing the recall ability of previously trained skills after a time of disuse, and
found that proficiency declines after a period of non-practice (Ammons, Farr,
Bloch, Neumann, Dey, Marion, & Ammons, 1958; Fleishman & Parker, 1962;
Wright, 1973). Ammons et al. (1958) found that the decay of flight skills was
present regardless of the duration of elapsed time without practice. Participants
were given up to eight hours of training to proficiency for a simulated flight task.
After a “no-practice interval” from 24 hours to two years, a greater loss of skill
occurred as time since the last practice increased. Flight skill quickly returned to
proficiency, up to 75 percent, in as little as five minutes of practice after the
hiatus. Certified pilots also suffered from “profound…rapid… and pervasive”
(Childs, Spears, & Prophet, 1983, p. 30) flight skill loss after relatively short
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periods of non-practice. Private pilots who did not continuously practice flight
maneuvers, especially those critical during aircraft emergencies, would quickly
lose proficiency in the procedure or the application of those maneuvers in as little
as eight months.
In the case of Colgan Air Flight 3407, when the Captain recognized the
aircraft was in an aerodynamic stall, he incorrectly applied the required technique
for recovery, exacerbating the condition, and rendered the aircraft unrecoverable
(NTSB, 2010). Investigators were unable to determine why a certified Captain
would act inappropriately to a flight maneuver that is evaluated during initial and
recurrent training. Typically, Captains are required to successfully demonstrate
these maneuvers every six months while First Officers receive this training once
a year. The training is intended to maintain the proficiency of flight crews in
identifying and reacting appropriately to in-flight emergencies.
The flying environment today has changed to that of less manual flying
and more use of automation. Furthermore, the type of operation also dictates the
amount of practice a pilot receives. The shorter trips flown by domestic carriers
offer both pilots a daily opportunity to practice their skills. However, that is in
sharp contrast to international pilots who may only get a chance to operate the
controls a few times per year. Relief pilots during international flights rotate
positions to allow the Captain and First Officer an opportunity to rest during
cruise flight and normally do not get an opportunity to actually manipulate the
controls. The lack of actual flying experience from international flight crews may
11

have contributed to a Sydney bound United Airlines flight that came within 100
feet of a mountain after takeoff from San Francisco in 1999 (Carley, 1999). After
experiencing an engine failure, the flying pilot of the B-747-400 did not perform
the proper recovery technique, which exacerbated the critical condition of the
aircraft and nearly collided with a mountain. The one takeoff and landing the pilot
had performed the week before the incident was the first in nearly a year.
Cognitive Aspects of Flight
Flight does not exclusively involve motor skill but is also highly dependent
upon cognitive processing, which is just as susceptible to decay after periods of
disuse (Childs & Spears, 1986; Arthur et al., 1998; Wright, 1973). Flying is a
psychomotor process, involving both motor skills and cognitive processing to
achieve the desired flight path and maintain adequate situational awareness.
Childs and Spears (1986) found that the majority of flying skill was attributed to
cognitive performance and proficiency. Wright (1973) found that flight by
reference to instruments, placed significant cognitive demands on pilot
participants, and revealed that this type of flying was most affected after nonpractice intervals. Recent research has also revealed that cognitive skills, in
addition to physical skills, decrease over time without proper practice, especially
those skills that were learned early in training but not used for extended periods
(Arthur, Bennet, Stanush, & McNelly, 1998).
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Cognitive processing is a crucial skill involved in nearly every aspect of
piloting. Visual and other sensory cues, combined with flight data, all must be
efficiently processed for the pilot to make adequate and appropriate inputs to
control the aircraft as desired. For example, small corrections are made to the
flight controls, based on information from the flight instruments, to track a desired
course or maintain a specified altitude. Baron (1988) described the sensing of
flight data, its interpretation and processing, and subsequent physical
adjustments of the flight control to achieve the desired flight outcome, as being a
“closed-loop” control task. Pilots who are manually flying are continuously
performing this closed-loop processing. This skill is fundamental in the accurate
monitoring of an aircraft’s progress along a route of flight. Closed-loop
processing is the most demanding cognitive process performed on the flight deck
because so much information must be understood and acted upon in a very short
period of time.
Ebbatson (2009) found that pilots who had significant experience flying
traditional, non-glass cockpit aircraft, developed robust mental models of
performance characteristics during different phases of flight. These heuristics
allowed experienced pilots to quickly and accurately predict and anticipate
exactly how the aircraft would perform, thus reducing the high processing
demands imposed by closed-loop processing. These pilots developed their own
schema for the operation of the aircraft based upon experience with power
settings, descent profiles, and rules of thumb. They no longer had to perform
13

complex mathematical calculations to determine when to begin a descent; rather
they could simply apply the heuristic model for that situation. Less experienced
pilots, lack these heuristics and quickly become saturated, resulting in poor
aircraft control and planning. Over-dependence on automated systems
exacerbates this issue and further inhibits the ability to develop the required
mental models for manual flight.
Ebbatson (2009) conducted research on manual flight skill of pilots
transitioning from light twin engine training aircraft to modern airliners. By testing
their performance both before and after a 40-hour jet transition course, the
differences in control strategies became apparent. The students did not have
the proper experience to develop the schema needed to understand how the
aircraft would react to different power and pitch settings. The result was large,
coarse control inputs to achieve a desired aircraft condition. The students also
had significant difficulty in managing the inertia and energy of the larger aircraft,
and therefore had more trouble in predicting where in space the aircraft would
arrive at a given period of time. When measured after the 40-hour training
course, student performance improved most notably in their ability to anticipate
the performance of the jet aircraft and make smooth and precise control inputs
for the desired outcome.

14

A New Generation of Pilots
Today, an entire generation of pilots that has flown nothing but advanced
technology aircraft make up the majority of the workforce. Recent surveys
indicate that 46% of airline pilots had two or less years flying aircraft other than
those with glass cockpit (Gillen, 2008). The current generation of pilots is able to
command aircraft with increasing levels of sophistication, but is also losing some
of the original, “stick-and-rudder” (i.e., manual flight operation) skills. New pilots
lack the mental models and schema that older pilots have developed and
perfected over decades of flying due to the way pilots interact with modern flight
decks (Ebbatson, 2009). It is the concern of many pilots that the current
generation of pilots is being trained to be “…‘an era of button pushers’ not pilots”
(Rudisill, 1995, p. 4).
The overuse of automation is not entirely the fault of the pilot. The airlines
and even regulating authorities must shoulder some of the blame as well through
the implementation of various policies and procedures. The airlines promote the
use of automation, due to the high level of precision that automated systems
afford, as a means of flying efficiently and saving money (Weiner, 1998). In the
United States, the FAA has also taken advantage of the capabilities of modern
aircraft to increase air capacity in the NextGen air traffic environment (FAA,
2011). Technology no longer attempts to keep pace with the operators who use
it, but is becoming a means to save costs and increase the volume of aircraft
15

managed in the same amount of airspace. The result is a pilot population who
only knows flying with assistance of automation and feels less and less
comfortable with their manual flying ability (Gillen, 2008).
Recent Research on Manual Flight Skills in Airline Pilots
Research conducted by both Ebbatson (2009) and Gillen (2008) focused
on the manual flying ability of current airline pilots flying highly automated aircraft.
Both used sophisticated, high fidelity flight simulators with pilots performing
standardized manual procedures that were evaluated by certified check airman
(highly experienced pilots certified by regulating authorities to evaluate pilot
training.) The two studies differed slightly in their grading criteria due to different
certification standards of the regulating agencies (FAA, and Civil Aeronautics
Authority [CAA]).
Gillen (2008) performed flight maneuver testing in a simulator, but used
only check airman grades that were consistent with the standards issued by the
FAA to measure pilot performance. Grades were issued based on a 1 – 5 scale,
in which a score of 5 represented excellent performance and 1 signified major
deviations resulting in a crash or loss of aircraft control. A score of 4 represented
performance at the highest level of aircraft pilot certification or Airline Transport
Pilot (ATP) level and a score of 3 represented basic instrument certification skill
level. Captains are required to have ATP certification to serve as pilot in
command for airline-operated flights. Gillen found that most of the airline pilot
16

participants performed below ATP standards and closer to basic instrument skill
level for those maneuvers tested even though they were all highly experienced
pilots with major airlines. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) defines
a major air carrier as having total annual operating revenue of greater than
U.S.$1billion (U. S. Department of Transportation [DOT], 2011). There was no
correlation between total number of flight hours and the performance of the
pilots. All pilots were current airline pilots for a major United States air carrier
and proficient in their assigned aircraft.
Ebbatson (2009) used similar check airman grading for the flight
maneuvers examined, but also collected flight simulator data to further analyze
the level of performance. The grading was used as a validation for the results of
the simulator data. Ebbatson measured manual flight performance from 66
current airline pilots immediately after their annual proficiency check with the
airline and without any specific training for the research evaluation. The pilots
performed typical flight maneuvers normally demonstrated during their annual
proficiency check, consisting of an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to
landing and a missed-approach or “go-around”. The pilots also completed a
demographic survey, which outlined their previous flight history and recent
manual flight practice. Ebbatson’s findings showed that airline pilot manual flight
skill was very near to the minimum acceptable range for basic instrument flight
competency, as graded by the check airmen. In addition, airspeed control was
especially vulnerable to flight skill decay regardless of pilot total flight hours and
17

operational experience (military, cargo, or airline) the pilots had received prior to
their current assignment. The ability to correlate this information with flight
simulator data gave insight into specific flight realms in which flight performance
was especially waning, primarily the ILS approach to landing phase. Ebbatson’s
research revealed that the amount of manual flight practice a pilot performed in
the weeks immediately prior to the test, and during the course of normal airline
operations, was directly associated with the level of flight skill decay observed
across all pilots evaluated during the course of the study. The lack of recent
manual flight experience was correlated with poor measured performance. The
overall finding was that manual flight performance of pilots flying highly
automated aircraft suffered degradation regardless of previous aircraft types
flown or the type of operational experience accumulated throughout the career of
the pilot.
Using Pilot Voluntary Incident Reports
Evaluation of flight crew performance during flight operations can be very
valuable for the researcher. However, acquiring real world safety data utilizing a
Line Orientated Safety Audit (LOSA) can be a challenge due to enhanced airline
security measures that have been implemented since September 11, 2001.
Gaining access to the flight deck during flight to conduct research is nearly
impossible due to current security concerns, severely restricting how
observational data can be obtained. Furthermore, observational research on the
18

flight deck is not efficient because the opportunity to observe low-frequency
incidents that would require manual intervention is extremely limited. One
solution that provides a similar glimpse into the operational environment is
voluntary incident reports that may be obtained from National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) incident
reports.
The value of voluntary incident reports is immense, and the safety benefits
have been proven across many industries beyond aviation (Billings, 1998;
Chappell, 1994). Voluntary incident reports come from pilots experiencing real
events and can provide insight into real-world operations that cannot be achieved
in a laboratory setting. Researching incidents versus accidents provides access
to a higher volume of reports without the need for qualitative investigation of a
few accidents. Most important, the narrative format of incident reports provides
the necessary sequence of events to build a complete picture of the factors
leading to an incident and can often help to prevent future events (Billings, 1998).
Voluntary incident reports are fallible as well. The motivation to provide
details of a near accident is not always the same for each reporter, and therefore
a pilot may not complete a report for every incident (Chappell, 1994; Johnson,
2003). The motivation for reporting an incident may be from the potential
immunity from regulating agencies for certain types of incidents, or perhaps just
the prospect of contributing to aviation safety. Every reporter provides a bias
when providing a voluntary incident report based upon his or her motivation to do
19

so. In personal narratives, details may be omitted or embellished based upon
the significance of certain details or sequence of events (Chappell, 1994). These
biases are present in every report and must be recognized when drawing
conclusions based on the reports.
The Aviation Safety Reporting System
The Aviation Safety Reporting System at NASA Ames Research Center
was begun in 1979 and to date has amassed a database of over 900,000
voluntary reports have been amassed. NASA administers ASRS at the request
of the FAA. Pilots, controllers, mechanics, and flight attendants all contribute
information regarding unsafe events with immunity from punitive action from the
FAA (1997). ASRS maintains a high level of respect and credibility from all
stakeholders throughout the industry due to the high level of confidentiality
maintained.
In 2010, ASRS received over 58,000 reports, of which only 5,500 were
fully analyzed and made available to the public. The “full-form” report contains
the report narrative as well as 15 pages of additional coded information by expert
analysts based upon the original report that can be used for data retrieval and
statistical analysis (see Appendix A for a sample of the coding form). A database
containing all “full-form” reports is maintained by ASRS and can be accessed by
the public via an Internet-based interface (see Figure 1). The Internet interface
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allows searches of the entire database, retrieving only those reports that match
the search criteria.

Figure 1. ASRS Internet search interface

ASRS has produced over 60 research studies, and the database records
have been used by countless other researchers since its inception. The
information retained from the ASRS provides a unique opportunity to draw events
from the past that would normally not be available to researchers. Therefore, it
would be possible to select reports from the past that can be evaluated and
compared to current-day reports in order to draw conclusions about differences
between two periods of time. Identifying instances of manual flight deviations
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during the time that advanced technology aircraft were first introduced as
compared to those instances occurring when advanced technology aircraft were
almost exclusively operated provide valuable insight into the nature of the current
issue of manual flight skill decay. Many of the issues unique to advanced
technology aircraft such as complacency, over-reliance on automation, and lack
of hand-flying experience could be recognized by such a comparison.
According to the NTSB, there were only two fatal airline accidents in the
United States between the years 2006 and 2011. Both accidents involved
regional or commuter airlines (annual total operating revenues of under $100
million) and pilot error as a primary cause (DOT, 2011; NTSB, 2007; NTSB,
2010). As a direct result of these accidents, regional airline pilot training and
total flight experience was the subject of debate and scrutiny by the U.S.
Congress and the FAA. U.S. Representative Jerry Costello introduced the Airline
Safety and Pilot Training Improvement Act H.R. 3371 (2009) mandating an
increase in total flight experience for new regional First Officers from 250 to
1,500 total flight hours. Although the bill passed the House of Representatives
but stalled in the Senate, the idea remains popular and may be re-introduced.
New information regarding the manual flight ability of the current generation of
pilots can significantly influence future training procedures and regulations.
Total flight experience is not always an adequate marker or indicator of
manual flight performance. As mentioned earlier, Pilots who fly international
routes (i.e., international pilots) have significantly fewer opportunities to perform
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takeoff and landings compared to their domestic operating counterparts. Given
the limited practice of manually flying aircraft, international pilots are more prone
to experiencing flight deviations than pilots who routinely perform these tasks.
Although required to perform a minimum number of takeoff and landings, there is
no requirement that takeoff and landings be performed in an actual aircraft.
Flight simulators are used to maintain the currency of pilot skill when they are
unable to perform the necessary maneuvers with the aircraft. The limited
practice obtained by international pilots in actual aircraft may place the aircraft,
crew, and passengers in jeopardy when conducting flight operations, and there
are no foreseeable changes to these requirements.
Research Objective
Evidence supports a decline in manual flight skill of pilots who fly highly
automated modern aircraft. Research conducted thus far has provided valuable
insight into quantifiable performance issues captured using high fidelity
simulators and trained professionals. However, the majority of these studies
have been conducted in controlled environments that only mimic the actual
environment. Gathering data on pilot manual flight skills while operating actual
flight schedules is the most sought after piece of the puzzle and also the most
challenging. The purpose of this thesis was to evaluate research conducted on
manual flight skill loss by identifying instances when manual flight performance
fell below acceptable and safe levels, as recognized by the pilots themselves
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during actual flight operations. ASRS incident reports were used to answer the
following questions in regards to the manual flight skill of airline pilots:
1. Do ASRS incident reports indicate that there are differences in the manual
flight performance of airline pilots in traditional flight decks compared to
current-day airline pilots using advance flight decks?
2. Do ASRS incident reports indicate that there are differences in the manual
flight performance of regional airline pilots compared to major airline
pilots?
3. Do ASRS incident reports indicate that there are differences in the manual
flight performance of internationally operating airline pilots compared to
United States domestically operating pilots?
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Methods
Procedure
Exemption status was authorized from the San José State University’s
Institutional Review Board (see Appendix B) to conduct the present study using
voluntary pilot incident reports from NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System.
Traditional versus advanced flight deck aircraft. Two independent
searches were performed using the ASRS Internet database for incident reports
identifying events of potential degradation of manual flying ability. The searches
each consisted of two-year time periods beginning January 1993 through
December 1994, and January 2009 through December 2010. The 1993-1994
reports would be sorted to include only those aircraft with traditional flight deck
aircraft, while the 2009-2010 datasets would be sorted to include only advanced
technology flight decks aircraft.
Additional database filters were used to limit the search to include only
those reports from Section 14 of the Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 121
Certified Air Carriers. In previous studies, several different phases of flight were
manually flown in a flight simulator: ILS instrument approach, missed approach,
go-around, and holding (Gillen, 2008; Ebbatson, 2009). However, only on rare
occasions do pilots typically perform all these maneuvers during scheduled
operations. To maintain consistency with previous research and also capture the
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most representative flight maneuvers, the initial approach, final approach, and
landing flight phases were selected as additional filters. These flight phases
have resulted in 49% of all commercial jet-powered airline fatal accidents since
1959 (Boeing, 2011).
The resulting datasets were imported in spreadsheet form using .xls
format for use with Microsoft Excel®. The datasets contained categorized
information across the columns such as location, number of crew, aircraft type,
summary, and narrative. The individual reports populated each row. Utilizing the
sort feature of Microsoft Excel®, the information could be sorted by individual
category as desired.
The 1993-1994 dataset was sorted by aircraft type, which grouped each
make and model aircraft together. This method allowed quick visual identification
of all advanced technology aircraft (e.g., A320, B-767), which could then be
eliminated from the 1993-1994 dataset. The same process was repeated for the
2009-2010 dataset and traditional flight deck (e.g., DC-10, B-727), aircraft were
eliminated from the spreadsheet. Any aircraft that could not be identified as an
advanced or traditional flight deck aircraft, such as corporate aircraft, or
unspecified make and model was eliminated from the dataset.
Each report narrative was analyzed to identify those reports that met the
criteria of aircraft typically being manually or “hand” flown during the event.

26

There are many interpretation of manual flight, therefore for the purpose of this
research, manual flight was defined to be:
Pilot manipulation of the flight controls, without the assistance of flight
automation, specifically the autopilot and autothrottles; to maintain lateral,
vertical, and longitudinal control of an aircraft.
To qualify as being hand flown, the reporter would need to state that the
aircraft was under manual control or indicate that the automation was disarmed
during the event. The autopilot and autothrottles must not have been engaged.
This information could only be obtained by reading the narrative, as the ASRS
coding does not provide that information. If the aircraft could not be determined
to be under manual flight control, the report was discarded.
In addition to being hand flown, there must have also been a departure
from standard operating protocol or flight profile that demonstrated an unsafe act
or procedure. A stabilized approach as defined by the Flight Safety Foundation’s
Approach and Landing Accident Reduction (ALAR) Task Force (2000) was used
as a measure of an unsafe flight profile (see Figure 2). If any one of these
elements was not satisfied, then the approach was considered unsafe and the
report was selected.
Reports that indicated a departure from the stabilized approach criteria
that may have been caused by an external force, such as air traffic control (ATC)
handling, Traffic Collision and Avoidance System (TCAS) II alerts, or weather
27

conditions were discarded. These external forces introduced potential confounds
that made it difficult to determine whether an unstabilized approach was due
entirely to the manual flying ability of the pilot.
ATC handling factors included variations in controller guidance that may
cause pilots to perform an unstabilized approach in order to comply. Examples
include late or incorrect turns onto the final approach course and maximum or
minimum speed restrictions. Pilots are required to comply with all TCAS II alerts
to avoid potential traffic conflicts. Often the Resolution Advisory that
accompanies a traffic alert requires a maximum performance turn, climb, or
descent. Often these alerts occur during approach to landing when aircraft are in
close proximity to each other. Weather phenomena such as wind shear and
microburst, often occur without warning and can quickly cause an unstabilized
approach. These types of external forces and events cause the pilots to deviate
from their planned approach profile and provide little time to adjust to the
changing situation while at low altitudes. In addition, pilots who indicated that
their performance was affected by fatigue were also eliminated. The reports that
met these final requirements were tallied for statistical analysis.
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Figure 2. Recommended elements of a stabilized approach from Flight
Safety Foundation. Reprinted with permission from Flight Safety
Foundation. Copyright © 2000 by Flight Safety Foundation
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Regional air carriers versus major air carriers. A third ASRS database
search was performed using the ASRS Internet interface for a 10-year period
beginning with January 2001 and ending December 2010. The Internet interface
was used to filter results capturing only CFR Part 121 Air Carriers during the
approach and landing phases. Unlike the previous database searches, one
additional search filter was used. From the Event Type search item, the In-flight
Event category was chosen, followed by the value Unstabilized Approach. This
additional step produced only those reports that an ASRS Analyst coded as
unstabilized. The purpose for this additional step was to limit the total number of
reports to fewer than 5,000, which is the maximum results allowed.
The resulting dataset was then sorted by aircraft type using Microsoft
Excel® into two categories, separating the regional aircraft (e.g., EMB-145, ATR72) from those used by major air carriers (e.g., B-737, A320).
The report narratives were analyzed to identify those reports that met the
criteria of typically being manually or “hand” flown during the event. In addition to
being hand flown, there must have also been a departure from standard
operating protocol or flight profile that demonstrated an unsafe act or procedure.
If any one of the elements in the Flight Safety Foundation ALAR Task Force’s
stabilized approach criteria was not satisfied then the approach was considered
unsafe and the report was selected. The reports that met these final
requirements were tallied for statistical analysis.
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Reports that indicated a departure from the stabilized approach criteria
that may have been caused by an external force, such as ATC handling, TCAS II
alerts, or weather conditions were discarded. These external forces introduce
potential confounds that question whether an unstabilized approach was due
entirely to the manual flying ability of the pilot. In addition, pilots who indicated
that their performance was affected by fatigue were also eliminated. The reports
that met these final requirements were tallied for statistical analysis.
International versus domestic operations. Using the reports previously
identified as Major Air Carriers during the same 10-year period, additional sorting
was conducted using Microsoft Excel® to separate aircraft associated with
international operations. Typically these aircraft are larger, wide-body aircraft
such as B-747, A310, and MD-11. Additional sorting was needed to identify
those incidents that occurred at foreign airports or the reports that identified an
additional relief pilot (check airmen excluded) signifying flights that exceeded
eight hours of flight time. Only aircraft that were considered wide-body, operating
at a foreign destination or with an additional relief pilot were included.
The report narratives were analyzed to identify those reports that met the
criteria of typically being manually or “hand” flown during the event. In addition to
being hand flown, there must have also been a departure from standard
operating protocol or flight profile that demonstrated an unsafe act or procedure.
If any one of the elements in the Flight Safety Foundation APLR Task Force’s
stabilized approach criteria was not satisfied then the approach is considered
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unsafe and the report was selected. The reports that met these final
requirements were tallied for statistical analysis.
Reports that indicated a departure from the stabilized approach criteria
that may have been caused by an external force, such as ATC handling, TCAS II
alerts, or weather conditions were discarded. These external forces introduce
potential confounds that question whether an unstabilized approach was due
entirely to the manual flying ability of the pilot.
International operations require long duty periods across multiple time
zones, and therefore fatigue cannot be avoided. Fatigue was determined to be
inevitable factor for international operating pilots and was therefore was not used
as a basis for report elimination.
Data Analysis
A Chi-Square (χ2) analysis was determined to be the appropriate statistic
to compare the datasets and determine if there were actual differences in manual
flying ability. The χ2 test measures how observed data in independent samples
will compare to the expected or predicted outcome of that data. This test would
indicate a real difference in the datasets and not just a difference found by
chance or sampling errors. In determining the answer to the research questions
listed in the previous section, they were formulated into mathematical questions
containing a null and alternative hypothesis.
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1. Null Hypothesis (H0): There is no significant difference between the number
of unstabilized, manually flown approaches from airline pilots operating traditional
flight deck aircraft from current-day airline pilots operating advanced flight decks.
2. Null Hypothesis (H0): There is no significant difference between the number
of unstabilized, manually flown approaches of regional airline pilots from those
flown by major airline pilots.
3. Null Hypothesis (H0): There is no significant difference between the number
of unstabilized, manually flown approaches from internationally operating airline
pilots from United States domestically operating airline pilots.
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Results
Traditional Versus Advanced Flight Deck Aircraft
The dataset covering the years 1993-1994 yielded a total of 2,455 reports.
Of that dataset, 998 reports pertained to aircraft with traditional style flight decks
only. Of those, 36 reports indicated degradation in manual flying ability as
indicated by a deviation from the stabilized approach criteria.
The dataset covering the years 2009-2010 yielded a total of 1,267 reports.
Of that dataset, 930 reports pertained to aircraft with advanced flight decks only.
Of those, 30 reports resulted in degradation in manual flying ability as indicated
by a deviation from the stabilized approach criteria.
A total of 1,928 ASRS reports were determined suitable for analysis. The
breakdown of the report totals is presented in Table 1.
Table 1. ASRS report totals for traditional flight decks and advanced
flight decks
Total Reports

Qualifying Reports

Unstabilized Approaches

Traditional Flight decks

2455

998

36

Advanced Flight Decks

1267

930

30

Total Reports

3722

1928

66

The Chi-Square (χ2) test was manually computed using a two-step
procedure: calculating the expected frequencies and calculating the χ2 test
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statistic. The expected value is the hypothetical outcome of the data if the null
hypothesis is true, and was determined by first tabulating and then summarizing
the data. A 2x2 table was constructed including the marginal totals, from which
the expected values could be calculated. Multiplying each of the column
marginal totals by each of the row marginal totals in Table 2 and dividing by the
total sample size determines the expected frequencies shown in Table 3.
Table 2. Marginal totals for traditional flight decks and advanced
flight decks
Unstabilized

Inconclusive

Total

Traditional Flight Decks

36

962

998

Advanced Flight Decks

30

900

930

Total

66

1862

1928

Table 3. Expected values for unstabilized approaches for traditional
flight decks and advanced flight decks
Unstabilized
Traditional Flight Decks

E=

66x998
= 34.16
1928

Advanced Flight Decks

E=

66x930
= 31.84
1928

€

€
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χ2 =

(36 − 34.16) 2 (30 − 31.64) 2
+
34.16
31.64

χ2 = 0.20
€

The table was determined to have one (1) degree of freedom. With the

€
degrees of freedom calculated and the χ2 value known, this information is
compared to a distribution table for critical value of χ2. A significance level of α=
0.05 was used to provide a 95% confidence level in the event the null hypothesis
was rejected.
From the distribution table for critical values of χ2 with one (1) degree of
freedom and a α= 0.05, the critical value is 3.84 (Howell, 1985). The calculated
χ2 value of 0.20 falls well below the critical value of 3.84. The distribution table
shows the estimated probability for this χ2 value to be between 0.75 and 0.5.
The confidence level falls well below the 95% required and therefore the null
hypothesis was not rejected. Table 4 summarizes the results of the analysis.
Table 4. Summary of traditional and advanced technology flight deck
analysis results
Traditional Flight Deck

Advanced Technology Flight
Deck

998 Total Reports

930 Total Reports

36 Unstabilized Reports

30 Unstabilized Reports

Expected Value 34.16

Expected Value 31.84
2

χ = 0.20
Did not exceed critical value of 3.84

€
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Regional Versus Major Airline Pilots
The second ASRS database search covering the years between 2001 and
2010 resulted in a total of 667 reports classified as “Unstabilized Approach” by
the ASRS analyst. Of that dataset, 129 reports pertained to regional aircraft only.
Of those, 17 reports described degradation in manual flying ability as indicated
by a deviation from the stabilized approach criteria. Of the 667 reports in the
dataset, 455 reports pertained to aircraft flown by major airlines operating
domestic only flights. The number of reports that described degradation in
manual flying ability as indicated by a deviation from the stabilized approach
criteria was 42. The breakdown of the reports is presented in Table 5.
Table 5. Report totals listed by air carrier size
Air Carrier Size

Qualifying Reports

Unstabilized

Regional

129

17

Major

455

42

The Chi-Square (χ2) test was also manually computed using a two-step
procedure: calculating the expected frequencies and calculating the χ2 test
statistic. A 2x2 table was constructed including the marginal totals in Table 6,
resulting in the expected frequencies shown in Table 7.
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Table 6. Marginal totals for regional air carriers and major air carriers
Air Carrier Size

Unstabilized

Inconclusive

Total

Regional

17

112

129

Major

42

413

455

Total

59

525

584

Table 7. Expected values for unstabilized approaches for regional
and major air carriers
Unstabilized
Regional Air Carriers

Major Air Carriers

E=

E=

€

(59x129)
= 13.03
584

(59x455)
= 45.97
584

€
The χ2 value was calculated following the same procedure as explained in
the earlier analysis.

χ2 =

(17 −13.03) 2 (42 − 45.97) 2
+
13.03
45.97

χ2 = 1.55
€

With the degrees of freedom calculated and the χ2 value known, this

€

information is compared to a distribution table for critical value of χ2. A
significance level of α= 0.05 was used to provide a 95% confidence level in the
event the null hypothesis is rejected.
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From the distribution table for critical values of χ2 with one (1) degree of
freedom and a α= 0.05, the critical value is 3.84 (Howell, 1985). The calculated
χ2 value of 1.55 falls well below the critical value of 3.84. The distribution table
shows the estimated probability for this χ2 value to be between 0.25 and 0.1.
The confidence level falls well below the 95% required and therefore the null
hypothesis was not rejected. Table 8 summarizes the results of the analysis.
Table 8. Summary of regional and major air carrier analysis results
Regional Air Carriers

Major Air Carriers

129 Total Reports

455 Total Reports

17 Unstabilized Reports

42 Unstabilized Reports

Expected Value 13.03

Expected Value 45.97
2

χ = 1.55
Did not exceed critical value of 3.84

€
International Versus Domestic Airline Pilots
The second ASRS database search covering the years between 2001 and
2010 resulted in a total of 667 reports classified as “Unstabilized Approach” by
the ASRS analyst. Eighty-three reports pertained to internationally operating
aircraft only. Of those, 12 reports resulted in degradation in manual flying ability
as indicated by a deviation from the stabilized approach criteria. From the same
667 reports in the dataset, 455 reports pertained to aircraft flown by major
airlines operating domestically in the United States only. The number of reports
that described degradation in manual flying ability as indicated by a deviation
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from the stabilized approach criteria was 42. The breakdown of the reports is
presented in Table 9.
Table 9. Report totals listed by operation type
Operation Type

Qualifying Reports

Unstabilized

International

83

12

Domestic

455

42

The Chi-Square (χ2) test was also manually computed using a two-step
procedure: calculating the expected frequencies and calculating the χ2 test
statistic. A 2x2 table was constructed including the marginal totals in Table 10,
resulting in the expected frequencies shown in Table 11.
Table 10. Marginal totals for international and United States domestic
operations
Operation Type

Unstabilized

Inconclusive

Total

International

12

71

83

Domestic

42

413

455

Total

54

484

538

Table 11. Expected values for unstabilized approaches for
international and United States domestic operations
Unstabilized
International Operations

E=

U.S. Domestic Operations

E=

€
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€

(54 x83)
= 8.33
538

(54 x455)
= 45.67
538

The χ2 value was calculated following the same procedure as explained in
earlier analyses.
(12 − 8.33) 2 (42 − 45.67) 2
χ =
+
8.33
45.67
2

χ2 = 1.91
€

With the degrees of freedom calculated and the χ2 value known, this

€

information is compared to a distribution table for critical value of χ2. A
significance level of α= 0.05 was used to provide a 95% confidence level in the
event the null hypothesis is rejected.
From the distribution table for critical values of χ2 with one (1) degree of
freedom and a α= 0.05, the critical value is 3.84 (Howell, 1985). The calculated
χ2 value of 1.91 falls well below the critical value of 3.84. The distribution table
shows the estimated probability for this χ2 value to be between 0.25 and 0.1
meaning the differences were not statistically significant. The confidence level
falls well below the 95% required and therefore the null hypothesis was not
rejected. Table 12 summarizes the results of the analysis.
Table 12. Summary of international and United States domestic
operations analysis results
International Operations

U.S. Domestic Operations

83 Total Reports

455 Total Reports

12 Unstabilized Reports

42 Unstabilized Reports

Expected Value 8.33

Expected Value 45.67
2

χ = 1.91
Did not exceed critical value of 3.84
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€

Discussion
The intent of this thesis was to explore the measurable difference in
manual flying performance of airline pilots as indicated by voluntary pilot incident
reports. ASRS reports were used in an effort to provide categorical data to
support previous research on this topic indicating a decline in manual flight
performance due to the prevalence of flight deck automation in modern aircraft.
Traditional flight decks versus advanced flight decks. The analysis
showed that there was no significant difference between ASRS reports from
traditional flight deck versus advanced flight deck configurations. This does not
disprove that there is no real difference, but rather no difference as indicated by
the reporters from ASRS incident reports.
The number of qualifying reports for both the traditional and advanced
flight decks (over 900 each) was sufficient to produce a statistically significant
result. However, the numbers of manually-flown, unstabilized approach reports
were only 3.6% and 3.2% of the total respectively. The low number of
unstabilized reports was the product of eliminating potential confounds in the
data in order to maintain the strict criteria of determining whether the aircraft was
manually or hand-flown. Items that could affect pilot performance such as wind
gusts, fatigue, or ATC handling would disqualify the use of the report. The
results of the statistical testing cannot rule out chance as a conclusion for the two
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datasets containing nearly identical unstabilized, manually flown approaches to
landing.
In the course of reviewing and analyzing the datasets, interesting trends
emerged. One of the issues that plagued pilots of traditional aircraft was
attempting an approach to landing while aligned with the wrong runway, or even
worse, the wrong airport. There were at least 64 of these pilot navigation errors
in a dataset of 998 total reports. Newer aircraft with advanced technology flight
decks appears to have greatly enhanced pilot situational awareness in this
instance, as there were only nine reports of runway confusion out of a dataset of
930 reports.
The report analyses also revealed a substantial increase in unstabilized
approaches from pilots using advanced technology flight decks. In 35 incidents,
flight crews flying highly automated aircraft often experienced automation
surprise when flight automation did not react as intended due to autopilot modes
suddenly changing or the pilots mistakenly selected the incorrect mode.
Flight to ZZZ planned landing for Runway XXL back course. The Captain
was the flying pilot and I was pilot monitoring until I was given the flight
controls for the company procedures approach. We were given a 30
degree intercept and were cleared for the approach at about a 12 mile
final. The Captain inadvertently selected VOR/LOC, which caused the
plane to quickly turn the incorrect way heading southwest. The Captain
disconnected the autopilot and turned the aircraft back to the northeast to
re-intercept the course…We need to be more aware of selection on the
MCP and maintain situational awareness at all times. The FOM clearly
states that HDG SELECT must be used and we failed to catch this error.
When executing a non-precision or back course procedure we must
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maintain situational awareness at all times and listen to our approach
briefings very intently. (ACN 834074)

The research did reveal some interesting observations regarding
generational differences in their approach to flying aircraft. Reports from pilots in
the earlier dataset seemed accustomed to air traffic controllers providing
clearances that would stress the aircraft and the pilots flying them to the
maximum achievable performance in order to successfully complete the flight.
Today, pilots are often critical of air traffic control and blame air traffic controllers
for “slam dunk” approaches that resulted in unstabilized approach criteria.
I am writing this report because after landing in DTW I was instructed by
DTW Ground Control to phone the DTW TRACON. I spoke to a
Supervisor during our phone conversation he told me he was going to file
an airspeed deviation on us because when we were told by his final
Controller to maintain 180K until 5-mile final…It was then I called visual on
the runway. The Controller then told us we were cleared for the visual for
Runway 22R and to maintain 180 KTS until 5-mile final. I immediately told
him we were unable to maintain the 180K clearance. At that point the
Controller canceled our clearance and vectored back around for an
uneventful approach and landing to 22R. During the time we were picking
up the runway, we knew we were high on glideslope and our only chance
for a stabilized approach was to slow down and to configure the aircraft
with Flaps 40. We were also discussing the probability of a go-around.
This is without a doubt one of the worst vectors to final in my 35+ years of
flying. It was very obvious that the Controller did not have a good
understanding of what it takes to descend a B737NG aircraft from an 8000
FT downwind, nor did he understand the dynamics of slowing and
descending at the same time. (ACN 844756)

The aircraft flown today are also managed differently, utilizing flight
management computers to plot their course and follow specific decent profiles.
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The assistance gained by the flight automation can significantly enhance pilot
situational awareness and free cognitive resources during the approach to
landing. On the other hand, in the case of a last minute runway change or
unexpected flight guidance mode, the pilots would become so distracted
reprogramming and/or re-arming the automation, that they forget their primary
goal of flying the aircraft.
The use of automation is often perplexing to many pilots who were only
accustomed to flying in aircraft with traditional style flight decks. This lack of
familiarity with technology in the flight deck can be overwhelming. The following
excerpt elaborates on this concept.
This was an extremely challenging approach due to weather, ATC and my
lack of experience on a 757 with a glass cockpit modification. I am not
type rated in any aircraft with the glass presentation and have minimal
experience with glass, especially the speed and altitude tape presentation.
This significant change was implemented with an Operating Manual
revision and limited instruction several months ago at a recurrent training.
I have requested additional training numerous times; however,
Management had repeatedly denied my request. … The reality is most
pilots do not need the training because they have been trained and flown
the B737, B777, Regional Jet or any one of the numerous current day
military aircraft. The fact is, I have not been trained on any of these
aircraft … I will not fly another one of these modified aircraft until I am
comfortable with the new technology. (ACN 884407)

An entirely new generation of pilots seem very comfortable, almost
dependent upon technology, often to the point where manually flying an aircraft
seems like a foreign concept.
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On approach … with my First Officer flying, the autopilot disconnected by
itself about 1,200 FT AGL ... First Officer just looked at me and said what
do I do now? I noticed that his FD LOC bar had also disappeared. I told
him to fly the airplane using the raw data information that was still
displayed with a good ID. He said 'what, down to minimums?' By this time
he had gotten high on the GS and I helped him get re-stabilized on the GS
and LOC. .... Make the First Officers shoot ILS approaches in training
without autopilot, autothrottles and FD to help support basic airmanship
skills. Callback conversation with Reporter revealed the following
information: The reporter stated that the First Officer had been with the
company for two years and prior to that had flown commuter aircraft for a
number of years. The Captain believed the First Officer's initial reaction
was to go around and try for another coupled approach rather than to fly
raw data that was available. They talked about this event on the ground
as an educational exercise for both pilots and decided that pilots should
be taking responsibility for remaining current flying glass cockpit aircraft in
their most basic modes (ACN 817511).

Regional versus major airline pilots. No significant difference was
found between the manual flying ability of regional airline pilots versus major
airline pilots. The hypothesis proposed that inexperienced regional pilots, who
may have been hired with lower total flight hours, did not fully develop the flight
skills need to fly a complex aircraft without the assistance of automation.
Furthermore, regional pilots may become more and more dependent upon the
automation and are lulled into a sense of complacency while using it. However,
the statistical testing of the ASRS reports did not support this hypothesis.
In an attempt to limit the total number of potential qualifying reports, the
ASRS database search for the years 2001-2010 was purposely limited to those
reports identified by ASRS analysts as “unstabilized approach” instead of
searching for all reports during the approach and landing phases of flight. This
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decision was made to prevent the analysis of potentially tens of thousands of
reports. There is potential that many hand-flown, unstabilized approach reports
were not included in the analysis because the entire ASRS database for this tenyear period was not searched. This difference in reports may have changed the
outcome of the chi-square testing.
There were many case-by-case examples where clearly the pilot flying
was over-dependent upon the automation that resulted in an unstabilized
approach.
Requiring the use of the autopilot for ALL IMC approaches have made
pilots hesitate to turn off the autopilot and just hand fly. The pilots are no
longer as proficient as they once were, and their confidence in hand flying
an approach is greatly diminished … Automation is a great thing, but
sometimes doing it by hand works a lot better, and we could have avoided
the missed approach to begin with. The SOPs are too restrictive in this
regard. Turning the autopilot on after going missed would have helped a
great deal due to the work load and unfamiliar ops. (ACN 854880)

Other times it seemed that new regional pilots never had the opportunity
to learn many of the basic maneuvers because their primary flight training was
oriented to airline flying emphasizing the use of automation from the very
beginning.
I believe another reason it happened, is the First Officer's lack of
experience in entering patterns to controlled fields on a visual, or lack of
previous experience entering uncontrolled field patterns. He had less than
300 hours when hired here, no CFI, and went right to the jet, which doesn't
do many uncontrolled field or controlled field complete visual patterns. I
learned this teaching my students, flying charter, flying my previous
airliner (to many uncontrolled fields) and being a former Line Check
Airman, which was very helpful in this area, and is some of the experience
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many of our jet First Officer's will never get. We should be hiring
CFI's/pilots with more experience. Better visual pattern training in the
simulator and on IOE. Better briefs for pattern entry. We discussed the
event, and what went wrong. We also discussed what could be done
better in future visual patterns for planning, entry, descent, and CRM. He
will do better in the future, but I'm not so sure about other inexperienced
jet First Officer's. (ACN 844841)

Internationally operating pilots versus United States domestically
operating pilots. ASRS reports revealed no statistical difference between the
manual flying ability of internationally operating pilots versus domestically
operating pilots. Although internationally operating pilots perform fewer landings
then their domestic counterparts, the statistical testing did not reveal any
increase in the number of unstabilized, hand-flown approaches performed
according to ASRS reports.
As mentioned earlier, additional qualifying ASRS reports may have been
discovered if the entire database was searched for the ten-year period. In
addition, finding a suitable number of qualifying reports that were associated with
manual flight was difficult. International operating Captains are usually the most
senior pilots in the airline with vast amounts of flight experience. Often pilots
understand that the combination of their lack of recent experience and their
unavoidable fatigue, even with an augmented crew, would necessitate the need
for the assistance of flight automation. Even with the assistance of additional
relief pilots and automation, procedural errors occurred such as incorrect flap
configurations or forgetting to lower the landing gear.
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Occasionally, a pilot would recognize their unfamiliarity with manually
flying the aircraft due to lack of recent practice and express their concern.
“This is a standard VFR pattern, yet one I had not accomplished in nearly 10
yrs. Needless to say, I was rusty on some of the fundamentals … Lesson,
don’t forget the fundamentals especially on little used approaches.” (ACN
521299)
Conclusion
There has been much discussion in the mainstream media about manual
flight ability of airline pilots during the time this thesis was written. Recently, two
reports have been released indicating that the decline in manual flight skill of
airline pilots is recognized throughout the industry and capturing the attention of
regulating agencies (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses [BEA], 2011; Lowy, 2011).
Most recently, the information recovered from the flight data recorders of
Air France Flight 447 revealed a potential breakdown in pilot manual flight skill
when the automation failed. According to an interim report released by the
French investigative authority, BEA (2011), when the aircraft automation was
unable to properly maintain control of the aircraft, the autopilot automatically
disconnected, and reverted command back to the pilots. Although the aircraft
was in an aerodynamic stall condition, the flight data showed the pilots
commanded a nose-up pitch attitude versus a required nose-down pitch attitude
to maintain control of the aircraft. This technique is contrary to basic training that
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every pilot receives during aerodynamic stall training, regardless of aircraft type.
Coincidentally, the Captain of Colgan Flight 3407 commanded the same nose-up
pitch attitude in response to the same flight condition (NTSB, 2010).
In addition, excerpts from a draft report issued by an FAA advisory
committee highlights airline pilots’ over-reliance on flight automation and
therefore are “‘forgetting how to fly’” (Lowy, 2011, p.1). The draft report, after
examining accident and incident reports, found that over 60% of accidents and
30% of incidents involved manual flight difficulties or mistakes involving flight
automation. The report stated that typical issues involved pilots’ inability to
recognize flight automation disengaging or the failure to properly monitor and
maintain airspeed.
The results of the questions proposed by this thesis are inconclusive,
however the research conducted has revealed valuable information on the
subject of the decline in manual flight ability of airline pilots. After the review
many ASRS reports, some of the main points captured from analyzing the
reports are highlighted in the following statements.
•

Airspeed deviation was one of the most frequent causes of
manually-flown unstabilized approaches, regardless of year, airline
size, or airline type. This discovery supports the findings of
Ebbatson’s research (2009) that speed control is especially
susceptible to flight skill decay.
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•

Pilots seem very dependent upon technology. If there is an issue
with the automation, pilots will often opt to solve the automation
problem instead of manually flying the aircraft to landing.

•

Many times, regional airline pilots are the most dependent upon
using flight automation because their operating procedures
emphasized its use or their low total flight experience did not allow
them to become operationally proficient with manual flight control.

•

International pilots are conscious of their lack of flying proficiency
and chronic fatigue; therefore they choose to maximize the
assistance of flight automation during critical phases of flight.

•

Pilots feel that quite often Air Traffic Controllers force them into
accepting approach clearances that lead them into an unstabilized
approach as the only option to land.

•

Pilots also have mission-orientated personalities and will often try to
“make it (the approach) work” or “force it” while salvaging a poor
approach to landing even if they no longer meet stabilized criteria.

Curry (1985) found that many pilots were apprehensive of the risks
involved with implementing new technology into the flight deck. Twenty-five
years later, many of those risks seem, as predicted by Curry, to be occurring
throughout various elements within the aviation industry. Future research is
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needed to understand how the pilot operator interacts with current levels of
automation before future implementation of additional automation and other
technologies are introduced. The FAA envisions aircraft automation as a means
to increase the total number of airport operations and maximize the total number
of aircraft within the National Airspace System (FAA, 2011). How the proposed
use of flight technology and the increase in the number aircraft operating in the
same airspace will affect the flight crew has yet to be completely understood.
Regardless of the level of sophistication achieved in aircraft automation, the
fundamental human-machine interaction continues to be a weak link in the
advancement of safety within the industry. Enormous amounts of airline and
government funding are being invested to improve fuel efficiency and increase
airspace capacity (Karp, 2007), but the importance manual flying skill during
primary flight training must not be forgotten. The flying public should trust that a
safe and properly trained flight crew will be at the controls for each and every
flight, and that trust must not be compromised by the overuse of automation.
Pilot manual flight skill can be maintained through awareness of flight skill decay
causes, understanding the importance of routine manual flight skill practice, and
the implementation of airline procedures or policies to promote more frequent
manual flying.
Captain Sullenberger relied upon all his years of experience flying nonautomated aircraft when he manually flew the powerless A320 to a successful
ditching on the Hudson River in 2008. The next time that automation fails and an
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aircraft has to be manually flown, it is uncertain if the pilots will have the same
depth of flight experience as Captain Sullenberger to bring the aircraft to a
successful landing.
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